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HE ROLE of monetary actions in the administra-
tion’s new economic program has received little em-
phasis. Controlling inflation is an important objective
of the program, vet a conrse for monetary actions has
not been proposed. historical experience in the United
States~~aiic1 other countries indicates that the rate of
inflation is related very closely to the trend rate of
monetary expansion.
Inflation has been a major economic problem since
1965, but experience since 1969 has been especially
frustrating to the nation’s economic policymakers. In-
flation eontinned unabated in 1970, while unemploy-
ment rose sharply, and has since persisted in the face
of relatively high unemployment. Conventional stabili-
zation actions taken in the last three years to reduce
the growth of mone and Federal expenditures have
had their major impact oii outpnt rather than on the
price level. This de\-elopment has led some analysts to
become skeptical about the usefulness of traditional
monetary and Fiscal actions in coping with the current
economic situation.
The new economic program was announced on
August 15, outlining a set of measures designed to
deal with the problem of simultaneous inflation and
relatively high unemployment.’ A temporary wage—
price freeze was implemented, and a number of fiscal
actions were recommended with the objective of stim-
ulating output and employment. The second phase
of the program takes the form of Covemment inter-
vention in private wage and price decisions for pur-
poses of making certain that the rate of advance of
consumer prices is reduced to below a 3 per cent
annual rate by late 1972.
There are two major views prevailing with regard
to the current problc7m of simultaneous occurrence of
high unemployment and rapid inflation. One view
stresses the role of “market power” as a factor influ-
I The program also inc]uded important provisions relating to
the international system of exchange and the U. S. halanee
of payments. These provisions are not discussed here.
encing recent price level movements.2 The other
view’ is a part of the monetarist explanation of eco-
nomic processes, where the rate of inflation is de—
termined by the trend of monetary expansion. This
latter view attributes the simultaneous occurrence of
inflation and high and/or rising unemployment to
uncertainty regarding the state of total demand and
the costs of information and adjustment involved in
making price and output decisions. These t\vo views
relating to the current economic situation are dis-
cussed along with their policy implications. Preceding
the discussion of these two views is a brief survey
of economic developments from 1969 to the present.
Economic Developments From Late 1969
to the Present
Monetary and fiscal actions turned restrictive in
late 1968 and earl 196f, and this policy stance was
maintained until early 1971. The money stock rose at
a 4 per cent average annual rate from early 1969 to
late 1970. following an 8 per cent increase in the year
ending first quarter 1969. So far this year monetary
actions have been very stimulative, \vith the money
stock rising at about a9per cent annual rate from
January to September.
Fiscal actions became less expansionary after pas-
sage of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of
1968, but more recently have turned stimulative. Fed-
eral expenditures rose at a 6 per cent average annual
rate from mid—1968 to late 1970. compared with a 15
per cent average rate of advance in the previous three
years Since the fourth quarter of 1970, growth of
Federal expenditures has accelerated to more than a
10 per cent rate. The income tax surcharge was im-
plemented in mid—196ft then allowed to expire in
mid-1970.
These stabilization actions, while having limited
success in slowing inflation, have had their primary
npact in reducing output growth and increasing un—
2
The term “market power” is ambiguous in its meaning. As
nsed here it is meant to encompass several views, including
“cost-push,” “administered price,” and “sellers’” inflation.
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employment. The average level of prices advanced
5.7 per cent from fourth quarter 1969 to fourth quarter
1970, then slowed slightly to a 4.7 per cent annual
rate. Unemployment increased from 3.6 per cent of
the labor force in December 1969 to 6.2 per cent a
year later, and has remained near this level, averaging
6 per cent in the first nine months of 1971.
A year before unemployment started rising, unit
labor costs, which had been rising since 1965, acceler-
ated further, reflecting a slowdown in productivity.
Compensation per man-hour rose at a 7 per cent aver-
agerate from late 1968 tosecond quarter 1971,the same
as from late 1965 to late 1968. In contrast, output per
man-hour slowed to a 1.2 per cent rate of increase
after late 1968, well below the 2 per cent average rate
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unit labor costs have increased at a
age rate since late 1968, compared
rate from late 1965 to late 1968.
5,8 per cent aver-
to a 4.3 per cent
Simultaneous Occurrence of Inflation
and Unemployment: Two Views
Inflation is a common economic problem, but infla-
tion in conjunction with high and/or rising unemploy-
meut is not so common. In the United States since
a-a- - -‘-~ - ~a-— ~a ~
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World War II, there have been few instances when
rapid inflation and high unemployment have per-
sisted together for a significant period of time. Any
such experiences lead some observers to develop the
opinion that conventional monetary and fiscal actions
are not adequate for the task of achieving what seem
to be conflicting social goals.
Explanations of the simultaneous occurrence of high
unemployment and inflation can be divided into two
categories. One attributes the source of the dilemma
to an “excess of market power” among certain ceo-
nomic units, and advocates Government intervention
in market pricing to supplement conventional mone-
tary and fiscal policies. The other views the inflation-
unemployment dilemma as a result of rational eco-
nomic behavior in the face of uncertainty, amid stresses
monetary and fiscal actions as the means of restoring
high employment and relative price stability)
Mark-ct Power View
According to the “market power” view, economic
units, most commonly labor or businesses, are said to
have excess market power when the prices of the
goods or services they sell can be pushed up despite
stable or falling demand. For example, because of
substantial bargaining power, union wages may be
pushed up faster than productivity advances. Firms
respond to the increase in unit labor costs by increas-
ing their prices so as to protect their profit margins.
According to this illustration, possession of market
power by either labor or firmns (or both) causes prices
to increase in the face of stable or declining demand.
Little evidence has been offered to support the
market power view as it applies to the conjuncture of
inflation and unemployment. For inflation to occur
(not just a once-and-for-all increase in the price level)
when demand is stable, market power must be grow-
ing, or the use of existing market power must be in-
creasing. The existence of market power, however
defined, probably means only that the price level is
higher than it would be if no such market po\ver
prevailed. If one is to argue consistently within this
view, a continuing rise in the price level can persevere
despite stable demand only if market power or its use
continues to grow.
3Those who demonstrate imnpatieace with conventional mone-
tary and fiscal actions are not prepared to abandon such
policies. Rather, these analysts feel that conventional stabili-
zatioa actions need to be supplemented at certain times to
improve their effectiveness. On the other hand, those who
oppose a supplement in the form of Government interven-
tion do so because they feel that the effeetiveaess of tradi-
tional actions would be hiadered by such interventioa,
:~st o~Information. ¶J~j.cw
The cost of information view concerning the simul-
taneous occurrence of inflation and unemployment
emphasizes the lags in adjustment of prices to an
excess of total demand relative to total supply.4 A
slosving of growth in total demand folloxving a long
period of excess demand and inflation, according to
this vie\v, can produce continuing inflation along with
declining output and rising unemployment. Such a
situation occurs, and is to be expected, because in-
formation about changes in total demand is not avail-
able without cost to decision-making units.
Information about demand can be acquired only at
a cost, and that cost varies with the speed at which it
is obtained. Firms and households must incur a high
cost per unit of information if they are to determine
quickly that a change in total demand has taken place.
There are also costs involved in adjusting prices and
output, so prices can be expected to respond only
slowly to a change in total demand. Under such cir-
cumstances of uncertainty, past price and demand
changes frequently are used to form expectations
about most likely future changes, and these expecta-
tions about demand will lag behind the actual facts
of the demand situation. Thus, following a period of
accelerating inflation, as from 1965 to 1969, there is a
tendency for inflation to continue until changed econ-
omic facts are recognized and eventually lead to ex-
pectations of a slowing in inflation.
Policy Implications of the Two Views
Evidence that clearly supports one view as opposed
to the other is difficult to develop. Nevertheless, the
implications of the two views for monetary policy are
of great significance and require further discussion.
flonet:tr~i-t,PoliOt, ant! the rt.I,,.rket: Ptn,~ er View
Since the problem of inflation in conjunction with
unemployment is viewed by some observers as one of
excessive market power, the natural policy implica-
tion is to curb the growth of such power or the exer-
cise of existing power. A policy of Government inter-
vention to guide prices and wages in line with pro-
ductivity would supposedly lower the rate of inflation
sooner than otherwise.5 Furthermore, the implication
is that with prices and wages directly controlled in
~Thisview does not deny the existence of market power, but
it does deny the growth or growing use of that power as
a major factor explaining inflation.
5
Note that attention is focused on the inflation aspect of the
problem. There is no disagreement between the two views
on improving the operation of free markets.
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this way, monetary and fiscal actions can properly be
conducted towards stimulating total demand. An in-
crease in total demand with prices “directly” con-
trolled would be reflected in increased output and
employment.
Monetartt Potion a.nd the Cost of
Information View
The information-cost view of the inflation-unem-
ploymnent dilemma is that the current situation is
“temnporary.” Following four years of accelerating in-
flation, the length of this period of adjusthient to
slower growth in total demand is probably quite sub-
stantial. Flowevcr, according to this viexv, it is desir-
able for the economic system to comnplete the adjust-
ment without direct Government intervention in the
price and wage policies of private economic units.
Direct intem-ventiou in the form of wage-price-pro-
ductivity formulae runs the risk of being viewed as a
substitute for anti-inflationary mnonetary and fiscal
actions; the return of monetary growth to a sustain-
able noninflationary rate consequently may be delayed.
Wage-price standards, when accompanied by sus-
tained rates of monetary expansion in excess of the
grosvth rate of potential output, will not prevent the
creation of pressures which eventually result in the
abandonment of any system of guidelines.0 Further-
more, controls hamper the operation of free markets,
\vhich are required to allocate resources according to
consumer wants.
Conclusions
Given that the new economic program is concerned
ultimately xvith achieving high employmnent with rela-
tively stable prices, historical experience indicates that
monetary expansion should be maintained at a rate
6
The experience with wage-price guideposts during the
1962-66 period is a case in point. See the 1970 Annual
Report of the Council of Economic Advisers (Washington,
D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, February 1970),
pp. 23-25.
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about equal to the growth of the economy’s produc-
tive potential, or about 4 per cent per year under
present circumstances. Whether a policy of moderate
monetary growth supplemented with Government in-
tervention in private wage and price policy can re-
store high employment with price stability more
quickly than without suc hasupplement is
problematical.
Recent monetary developments, if continued,
would provide the underlying basis for the control of
inflation. After increasing at a 12.5 per cent annual
rate from January to June, the money stock has slowed
to about a3per cent annual rate of increase from June
to September. If monetary actions am-c to contribute
towards the battle against inflation, moderate mone-
tary expansion must he continued until a trend rate
of money growth is established more in line with the
growth of productive potential.